Showing posts with label Terrorism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Terrorism. Show all posts

Thursday, September 15, 2011

The Evolution of a Pakistani Militant Network


The Evolution of a Pakistani Militant Network is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

By Sean Noonan and Scott Stewart

For many years now, STRATFOR has been carefully following the evolution of “Lashkar-e-Taiba” (LeT), the name of a Pakistan-based jihadist group that was formed in 1990 and existed until about 2001, when it was officially abolished. In subsequent years, however, several major attacks were attributed to LeT, including the November 2008 coordinated assault in Mumbai, India. Two years before that attack we wrote that the group, or at least its remnant networks, were nebulous but still dangerous. This nebulous nature was highlighted in November 2008 when the “Deccan Mujahideen,” a previously unknown group, claimed responsibility for the Mumbai attacks.

While the most famous leaders of the LeT networks, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed and Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi, are under house arrest and in jail awaiting trial, respectively, LeT still poses a significant threat. It’s a threat that comes not so much from LeT as a single jihadist force but LeT as a concept, a banner under which various groups and individuals can gather, coordinate and successfully conduct attacks.

Such is the ongoing evolution of the jihadist movement. And as this movement becomes more diffuse, it is important to look at brand-name jihadist groups like LeT, al Qaeda, the Haqqani network and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan as loosely affiliated networks more than monolithic entities. With a debate under way between and within these groups over who to target and with major disruptions of their operations by various military and security forces, the need for these groups to work together in order to carry out sensational attacks has become clear. The result is a new, ad hoc template for jihadist operations that is not easily defined and even harder for government leaders to explain to their constituents and reporters to explain to their readers.

Thus, brand names like Lashkar-e-Taiba (which means Army of the Pure) will continue to be used in public discourse while the planning and execution of high-profile attacks grows ever more complex. While the threat posed by these networks to the West and to India may not be strategic, the possibility of disparate though well-trained militants working together and even with organized-crime elements does suggest a continuing tactical threat that is worth examining in more detail.

The Network Formerly Known as Lashkar-e-Taiba

The history of the group of militants and preachers who created LeT and their connections with other groups helps us understand how militant groups develop and work together. Markaz al-Dawa wal-Irshad (MDI) and its militant wing, LeT, was founded with the help of transnational militants based in Afghanistan and aided by the Pakistani government. This allowed it to become a financially-independent social-service organization that was able to divert a significant portion of its funding to its militant wing.

The first stirrings of militancy within this network began in 1982, when Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi traveled from Punjab, Pakistan, to Paktia, Afghanistan, to fight with Deobandi militant groups. Lakhvi, who is considered to have been the military commander of what was known as LeT and is awaiting trial for his alleged role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, adheres to an extreme version of the Ahl-e-Hadith (AeH) interpretation of Islam, which is the South Asian version of the Salafist-Wahhabist trend in the Arab world. In the simplest of terms, AeH is more conservative and traditional than the doctrines of most militant groups operating along the Durand Line. Militants there tend to follow an extreme brand of the Deobandi branch of South Asian Sunni Islam, similar to the extreme ideology of al Qaeda’s Salafist jihadists.

Lakhvi created his own AeH-inspired militant group in 1984, and a year later two academics, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed and Zafar Iqbal, created Jamaat ul-Dawa, an Islamist AeH social organization. Before these groups were formed there was already a major AeH political organization called Jamaat AeH, led by the most well-known Pakistani AeH scholar, the late Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer, who was assassinated in Lahore in 1987. His death allowed Saeed and Lakhvi’s movement to take off. It is important to note that AeH adherents comprise a very small percentage of Pakistanis and that those following the movement launched by Saeed and Lakhvi represent only a portion of those who ascribe to AeH’s ideology.

In 1986, Saeed and Lakhvi joined forces, creating Markaz al-Dawa wal-Irshad (MDI) in Muridke, near Lahore, Pakistan. MDI had 17 founders, including Saeed and Lakhvi as well as transnational militants originally from places like Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian territories. While building facilities in Muridke for social services, MDI also established its first militant training camp in Paktia, then another in Kunar, Afghanistan, in 1987. Throughout the next three decades, these camps often were operated in cooperation with other militant groups, including al Qaeda.

MDI was established to accomplish two related missions. The first involved peaceful, above-board activities like medical care, education, charitable work and proselytizing. Its second and equally important mission was military jihad, which the group considered obligatory for all Muslims. The group first fought in Afghanistan along with Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wal-Suna, a hardline Salafist group that shared MDI’s ideology. Jamil al-Rahman, the group’s leader at the time, provided support to MDI’s first militant group and continued to work with MDI until his death in 1987.

The deaths of al-Rahman and Jamaat AeH leader Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer in 1987 gave the leaders of the nascent MDI the opportunity to supplant Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wal-Suna and Jamaat AeH and grow quickly.

In 1990, the growing MDI officially launched LeT as its militant wing under the command of Lakhvi, while Saeed remained emir of the overall organization. This was when LeT first began to work with other groups operating in Kashmir, since the Soviets had left Afghanistan and many of the foreign mujahideen there were winding down their operations. In 1992, when the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was finally defeated, many foreign militants who had fought in Afghanistan left to fight in other places like Kashmir. LeT is also known to have sent fighters to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan, but Kashmir became the group’s primary focus.

MDI/LeT explained its concentration on Kashmir by arguing that it was the closest Muslim territory that was occupied by non-believers. Since MDI/LeT was a Punjabi entity, Kashmir was also the most accessible theater of jihad for the group. Due to the group’s origin and the history of the region, Saeed and other members also bore personal grudges against India. In the 1990s, MDI/LeT also received substantial support from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI) and military, which had its own interest in supporting operations in Kashmir. At this point, MDI/LeT developed relations with other groups operating in Kashmir, such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jihad e-Islami and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Unlike these groups, however, MDI/LeT was considered easier to control because its AeH sect of Islam was not very large and did not have the support of the main AeH groups. With Pakistan’s support came certain restraints, and many LeT trainees said that as part of their indoctrination into the group they were made to promise never to attack Pakistan.

LeT expanded its targeting beyond Kashmir to the rest of India in 1992, after the destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque during communal rioting in Uttar Pradesh state, and similar unrest in Mumbai and Gujarat. LeT sent Azam Cheema, who Saeed and Iqbal knew from their university days, to recruit fighters in India. Indian militants from a group called Tanzim Islahul Muslimeen were recruited into LeT, which staged its first major attack with five coordinated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on trains in Mumbai and Hyderabad on Dec. 5-6, 1993, the first anniversary of the destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque. These are the first attacks in non-Kashmir India that can be linked to LeT. The group used Tanzim Islahul Muslimeen networks in the 1990s and later developed contacts with the Student Islamic Movement of India and its offshoot militant group the Indian Mujahideen.

The Student Islamic Movement of India/Indian Mujahideen network was useful in recruiting and co-opting operatives, but it is a misconception to think these indigenous Indian groups worked directly for LeT. In some cases, Pakistanis from LeT provided IED training and other expertise to Indian militants who carried out attacks, but these groups, while linked to the LeT network, maintained their autonomy. The most recent attacks in India — Sept. 7 in Delhi and July 13 in Mumbai — probably have direct ties to these networks.

Between 1993 and 1995, LeT received its most substantial state support from Pakistan, which helped build up LeT’s military capability by organizing and training its militants and providing weapons, equipment, campaign guidance and border-crossing support in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. LeT operated camps on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border as well as in Kashmir, in places like Muzaffarabad.

At the same time, MDI built up a major social-services network, building schools and hospitals and setting up charitable foundations throughout Pakistan, though centered in Punjab. Its large complex in Muridke included schools, a major hospital and a mosque. Some of its funding came through official Saudi channels while other funding came through non-official channels via Saudi members of MDI such as Abdul Rahman al-Surayhi and Mahmoud Mohammad Ahmed Bahaziq, who reportedly facilitated much of the funding to establish the original Muridke complex.

As MDI focused on dawah, or the preaching of Islam, it simultaneously developed an infrastructure that was financially self-sustaining. For example, it established Al-Dawah schools throughout Pakistan that charged fees to those who could afford it and it began taxing its adherents. It also became well-known for its charitable activities, placing donation boxes throughout Pakistan. The group developed a reputation as an efficient organization that provides quality social services, and this positive public perception has made it difficult for the Pakistani government to crack down on it.

On July 12, 1999, LeT carried out its first fidayeen, or suicide commando, attack in Kashmir. Such attacks focus on inflicting as much damage as possible before the attackers are killed. Their goal also was to engender as much fear as possible and introduce a new intensity to the conflict there. This attack occurred during the Kargil war, when Pakistani soldiers along with its sponsored militants fought a pitched battle against Indian troops in the Kargil district of Kashmir. This was the height of Pakistani state support for the various militant groups operating in Kashmir, and it was a critical, defining period for the LeT, which shifted its campaign from one focused exclusively on Kashmir to one focused on India as a whole.

State support for LeT and other militant groups declined after the Kargil war but fidayeen attacks continued and began to occur outside of Kashmir. In the late 1990s and into the 2000s, there was much debate within LeT about its targeting. When LeT was constrained operationally in Kashmir by its ISI handlers, some members of the group wanted to conduct attacks in other places. It’s unclear at this point which attacks had Pakistani state support and which did not, but the timing of many in relation to the ebb and flow of the Pakistani-Indian political situation indicates Pakistani support and control, even if it came only from factions within the ISI or military. The first LeT attack outside of Kashmir took place on Dec. 22, 2000, against the Red Fort in Delhi.

The Post-9/11 Name Game

In the months following 9/11, many Pakistan-based jihadist groups were “banned” by the Pakistani government. They were warned beforehand and moved their funds into physical assets or under different names. LeT claimed that it split with MDI, with new LeT leader Maula Abdul Wahid al-Kashmiri saying the group now was strictly a Kashmiri militant organization. Despite these claims, however, Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi was still considered supreme commander. MDI was dissolved and replaced by Jamaat-ul-Dawa, the original name used by Saeed and Iqbal’s group. Notably, both al-Kashmiri and Lakhvi were also part of the Jamaat-ul-Dawa executive board, indicating that close ties remained between the two groups.

In January 2002, LeT was declared illegal, and the Pakistani government began to use the word “defunct” to describe it. In reality it wasn’t defunct; it had begun merely operating under different names. The group’s capability to carry out attacks was temporarily limited, probably on orders from the Pakistani government through Jamaat-ul-Dawa’s leadership.

At this point, LeT’s various factions began to split and re-network in various ways. For example, Abdur Rehman Syed, a senior operational planner involved in David Headley’s surveillance of Mumbai targets, left LeT around 2004. As a major in the Pakistani army he had been ordered to fight fleeing Taliban on the Durand Line in 2001. He refused and joined LeT. In 2004 he began working with Ilyas Kashmiri and Harkat-ul-Jihad e-Islami. Two other senior LeT leaders, former Pakistani Maj. Haroon Ashiq and his brother Capt. Kurram Ashiq, had left Pakistan’s Special Services Group to join LeT around 2001. By 2003 they had exited the group and were criticizing Lakhvi, the former LeT military commander.

Despite leaving the larger organization, former members of the MDI/LeT still often use the name “Lashkar-e-Taiba” in their public rhetoric when describing their various affiliations, even though they do not consider their new organizations to be offshoots of LeT. The same difficulties observers face in trying to keep track of these spun-off factions has come to haunt the factions themselves, which have a branding problem as they try to raise money or recruit fighters. New names don’t have the same power as the well-established LeT brand, and many of the newer organizations continue to use the LeT moniker in some form.

Operating Outside of South Asia

Organizations and networks that were once part of LeT have demonstrated the capability to carry out insurgent attacks in Afghanistan, small-unit attacks in Kashmir, fidayeen assaults in Kashmir and India and small IED attacks throughout the region. Mumbai in 2008 was the most spectacular attack by an LeT offshoot on an international scale, but to date the network has not demonstrated the capability to conduct complex attacks outside the region. That said, David Headley’s surveillance efforts in Denmark and other plots linked to LeT training camps and factions do seem to have been inspired by al Qaeda’s transnational jihadist influence.

To date, these operations have failed, but they are worth noting. These transnational LeT-linked plotters include the following:

  • The Virginia Jihad Network.
  • Dhiren Barot (aka Abu Eisa al-Hind), a Muslim convert of Indian origin who grew up in the United Kingdom, was arrested there in 2004 and was accused of a 2004 plot to detonate vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices in underground parking lots and surveilling targets in the United States in 2000-2001 for al Qaeda. He originally learned his craft in LeT training camps in Pakistan.
  • David Hicks, an Australian who was in LeT camps in 1999 and studied at one of their madrassas. LeT provided a letter of introduction to al Qaeda, which he joined in January 2001. He was captured in Afghanistan following the U.S.-led invasion.
  • Omar Khyam of the United Kingdom, who attended LeT training camps in 2000 before his family brought him home.
  • The so-called “Crevice Network,” members of which were arrested in 2004 and charged with attempting to build fertilizer-based IEDs in the United Kingdom under the auspices of al Qaeda.
  • Willie Brigette, who had been connected to LeT networks in France and was trying to contact a bombmaker in Australia in order to carry out attacks there when he was arrested in October 2003.

While these cases suggest that the LeT threat persists, they also indicate that the transnational threat posed by those portions of the network focused on attacks outside of South Asia does not appear to be as potent as the attack in Mumbai in 2008. One reason is the Pakistani support offered to those who focus on operations in South Asia and particularly those who target India. Investigations of the Mumbai attack revealed that current or former ISI officers provided a considerable amount of training, operational support and even real-time guidance to the Mumbai attack team.

It is unclear how far up the Pakistani command structure this support goes. The most important point, though, is that Pakistani support in the Mumbai attack provided the group responsible with capabilities that have not been demonstrated by other parts of the network in other plots. In fact, without this element of state support, many transnational plots linked to the LeT network have been forced to rely on the same kind of “Kramer jihadists” in the West that the al Qaeda core has employed in recent years.

However, while these networks have not shown the capability to conduct a spectacular attack since Mumbai, they continue to plan. With both the capability and intention in place, it is probably only a matter of time before they conduct additional attacks in India. The historical signature of LeT attacks has been the use of armed assault tactics — taught originally by the ISI and institutionalized by LeT doctrine — so attacks of this sort can be expected. An attack of this sort outside of South Asia would be a stretch for the groups that make up the post-LeT networks, but the cross-pollination that is occurring among the various jihadist actors in Pakistan could help facilitate planning and even operations if they pool resources. Faced with the full attention of global counterterrorism efforts, such cooperation may be one of the only ways that the transnational jihad can hope to gain any traction, especially as its efforts to foster independent grassroots jihadists have been largely ineffective.



The Evolution of a Pakistani Militant Network is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

Thursday, July 14, 2011

The Dance with Death - 'Bomb'BAY





14 July 2011,

The city of dreams was attacked again. Yes, yet again.

3 years back, I left Bombay for good, just a day before 26/11 happened. I used to frequent Leopold's Cafe, the Sea Lounge at the Taj, and lived bang opposite where the Indian governments son-in-law Ajmal Kasab was caught. Watched it live on TV for 3 continuous days, and the only thought which came to mind was, why the hell did I have to leave the city a day before all that happened. Somehow, I wanted to be in the city when all of it was happening.. The pain I felt sitting in Delhi and watching it happen on screen made me cry for being helpless and not able to do anything for a city which I love the most. Just to be there with the people of Bombay, would have given some peace to my heart....

Fast forward to 2011, the cowards choose to attack the city again, this time with bombs at three different crowded places killing and injuring innocent people. One question always come to my mind, and which I want to ask these cowards:

- Why do you always keep attacking and target innocent civilians and the general public?
What do you achieve? Do you think it matters to the Indian Government or politicians? They are sitting ducks and shall continue to do so, until and unless you bang someone from within them... If you aim is to create fear in the minds of the public, then you are mistaken, as getting killed by a bomb blast is better than to die of hunger. Be it Bombay or any other place in India, the public will come out of their shelters and do their normal work and routine to feed their families. Conclusion- stop doing it. You are seriously not achieving anything, and simply wasting your time.

On the other hand, our media has no apathy left with the public. They come out with news headlines such as "Day after serial blasts, Mumbaikars venture out boldly'. My question to the media -- Do the people of Bombay or India have any other choice but to go about their routine work? To call this the spirit of Mumbai, it is like hiding the inefficiency of our security and political network. Politicians come out with statements such as these to save their @ss, the media should not!.

Numb.....

Sidharth Mehta
Dubai, UAE
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Mumbai Attacks July 2011, Mumbai Bomb blasts, Pathetic Journalism, Indian Government, Terrorist Attacks Strike Bombay, 13 July 2011, 26/11 Mumbai, India, The Great Indian Nightmare, Incredible India!, Sid Mehta, Sidharth Mehta, Siddharth Mehta, Inbuss, Infinity Business School Alumni, Dubai, Identity Crysys, Identity Crisis, Blog, Sid Mehta Blog,

Sunday, May 8, 2011

Post Osama - Time to act for India





'Osama wins gold medal for the game of hide and seek - 2001 - 2011' - I came across this statement on Facebook where a friend had put it across as his status update.... 'Quite apt for the story of Osama Bin Laden after the 9/11 attacks until he was finally killed by the US Navy SEALS in Abbottabad - Pakistan'....

Astonishingly, Osama was hiding in a 3 floor mansion, 90 kilometers from Islamabad - Pakistan's capital, just at a stone's throw distance from the Pakistan Military Academy in the garrison city of Abbottabad, which graduates the elite of the Pakistani Military. While the Pakistani military and intelligence graduate from this academy, it seems Osama was undertaking a five year long post graduation course which ended with a graduation ceremony done by the US forces instead of the Pakistani.

While Osama was hiding in this compound for the last five years, the whole world was searching for him in the mountains on the Af-Pak border... The Americans gave aid to Pakistan, which ran into billions of dollars to find this one man --- interestingly it seems, the Pakistani's instead built a mansion from a part of that money where they could hide Osama, and chose to continuously see the show, year after year, of the US government providing money and military support to the famished economy and top brass of the Pakistani nation.

Now that Osama is dead, this might have direct implications on the economy of Pakistan which was being supported by the aid money being given by the USA. If the money flow from the US gets curbed into Pakistan, it is pretty obvious that Pakistan will resort to exporting terror from the Kashmir route into India at a refreshing pace, given, it can't see India's economy getting stronger each day. It will shift it's focus from Af-Pak border to Kashmir once again.

On the other hand, full marks to the US government and its leadership, for going deep into Pakistan, finding the target, and eliminating it. No Arrests. No Drama. While India, even after having video proofs, and eye witnesses, are preaching to the world the lesson of law by spending billions feeding Kasab at Arthur Jail in Mumbai. The Indian Foreign Minister repeatedly 'requests' the Pakistani counterpart to 'have a look' at the numerous dossier's which India keeps providing to Pakistan with detailed information and whereabouts of Terrorists and criminals wanted by India and sheltered in Pakistan. Till date, Pakistan has never even thought of responding to these dossiers, leave aside actually handing over the criminals to India.

Our accomplishment in 60 years, is a troubled relationship with all our neighbors except for Bhutan. Our true friend. It is more important for us to listen to Kasab's demand of 'Butter Chicken' and watching 'Laawaris', and we feel proud of our judicial system of giving everyone a chance to put across his word in defense. Kasab, went ahead and ridiculed our judicial system, by saying, that the person in the video's and the photos is a 'Humshakal'/ a 'look-a-like' of his.. and our system is actually taking all this!...Our politicians and police men are seen crying at the death of magicians who proclaim themselves as god... Our corrupt politicians debate and decide more about the IPL than our country's policies of importance.

Our intelligence gives information to CIA about whereabouts of Osama (that he is in Abbottabad - RAW/2009)- it even gives information to Pakistan about a threat to Pervez Musharraf's life by Pakistani terrorists, the attempt which eventually was foiled. Our intelligence knows the full postal address of Dawood's residence in Karachi- we even have clear details of the guest list of his daughter's and son's marriage reception -- furthermore, our bollywood actors and actresses often met with Dawood and continue to do so, but still the don is safe.

No doubt, our commando's are capable to undertake an operation such as the one did by the US to eliminate Osama, deep inside enemy territory, but only if our NSG commando's are not made to 'baby-sit' our corrupt politicians. Our government is always happy to engage Pakistan in dialogue, whereas the Pakistani government takes the entire 'dialogue affair' as if they need to read out dialogues from a Bollywood movie. Literally!.

It is time, India eliminates the terrorists and criminals hiding inside Pakistan using full stealth help, the way the CIA and the Mossad of Isreal goes about eliminating its enemies. It is then, when Pakistan will truly come to the table to engage in dialogue.

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Sidharth Mehta
Dubai - UAE
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Key Tags - Osama Killed, Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan involvement Osama Killing, India Pakistan Relations, Terrorism, India, Kashmir, India post Osama, Al Qaida, Dawood, Kasab, 9/11, Mumbai Attacks, Sid Mehta, Sidharth Mehta, Siddharth Mehta, Identity Crysys, Identity Crisis, Full Start, Sid mehta Blog, Sidharth Mehta Blog, Infinity Business School - Alumni.


Saturday, September 5, 2009

Perspective: The Disaster of India's Disaster Management Plan



The biggest known fact about India's Disaster Management Plan is that, it is the biggest disaster in itself. Once and on many more uncountable occasions it has failed, and failed miserably to say the least. Without doubt, it shall continue to fail, given how it is being planned and managed till now, until and unless a dramatic and much required light of pleasant change embarks upon the policy makers of the world's largest democracy.

National Disaster Management (NDM) Authority of India takes care of disasters only which are natural in nature. Which means, only natural calamities like Floods, Draught, Tsunami's, Earthquakes etc, is what comes under the NDM. Even though this scope of work was acceptable may be in the past, surely in times such as now, where man-made disasters like Terrorism, happen if not more, but as frequently as natural disasters in India, the scope of work of the NDM needs to be expanded urgently. (http://www.ndmindia.nic.in/)

The main reason why disaster management is not taken seriously in India, is that the cost of a life of a common citizen in India is not at all important for the state. They hardly care how much blood is on the street, untill and unless someone dear to them/or someone like them is targetted.

The above is represented well in what the Deputy CM & Home Minister for Maharashtra, Mr. R R Patil, said in his infamous quote about the 26/11 Mumbai Attacks - "Bade shahron mein aise ek-do haadse hote rahte hain... Woh 5,000 logon ko marne aaye the, lekin humne kitna kum nuksan hone diya".

With all due respect to the late CM of Andhra Pradesh - Mr. YSR who died in a helicopter crash after his helicopter was missing and off the radar for almost 20 hours - Just take a look at what the Government actions were after the helicopter went missing:
5000 army men, an ISRO Remote Sensing Aircraft, a Sukhoi 30 fighter jet, 14 search choppers, the forest dept., Police, CRPF, Paramiliatary Forces, Tribals, Guides, and much more, all mobilised in not more than 3 hours for a missing CM. Obviously, the government was sleeping during 26/11, where they delayed calling the NSG's, did not have an aircraft ready to airlift the commando's from New Delhi for Mumbai, which by the way is our Financial Capital and should have commando's stationed there permanently anyways.

Worse, after reaching Mumbai, the NSG commando's were taken to Taj & Oberoi in BEST buses!! Were all the choppers of the Indian Air Force not airworthy which were stationed in Bombay, that they could not be air lifted and taken to ground zero? Our polititians & policy makers were trying to figure out how bad the situation was for the city, and only then wanted to call for the Army, NSG, Naval Commando's and the likes.
I think the best case study for "How to make a Disaster of Disaster Management".

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Sidharth Mehta
Dubai - UAE

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Key Tags - Disaster Management India, Terrorism Disaster Management India, Mumbai 26/11 Disaster Management, Biggest Search Operation in India - Andhra Pradesh CM goes missing & eventually died, Disaster Management Plan India, Disaster Management Analysis India, Incredible India, Sidharth Mehta

Tuesday, August 4, 2009

Recipe for Disaster: India's Suicidal Diplomacy


"An eye for an eye makes the whole world blind"
- Mahatma Gandhi


Lately, the Indian Goverment has gone blind when it comes to diplomacy towards Pakistan, but without an eye for the eye!

In the aftermath of the Mumbai Attacks, somewhere around mid- december 2008, when the Indian Armed Forces were on red alert, waiting for the political orders of a go ahead for pre-emptive strikes at different locations within Pakistan, one thought that this time atleast the usually sleeping elephant would awake and take some hard revenge. This revenge would not have been just for the victims of the Mumbai attacks, but for every Indian, who felt helpless and shelterless in their own house all those 3 dreadful days and many more before that. The mood was worse than 'enough is enough!'.

Fast forward 8 months, and still we have the culprit not been punished yet in our own country forget about the masterminds across the border. Things look just as pathetically bad as they were before, with no steps taken at all by Pakistan to bring the terrorists to justice and worse enough, India simply not doing anything to punish the terrorists. Rather, India has gone shamefully ahead in starting diplomatic talks with Pakistan, a day after the master mind of the Mumbai Attacks, Hafiz Saeed, is released by the Pakistani Authorities with much fan fare, and the usual reason being given as lack of evidence.

The much respected Dr. Manmohan Singh, PM of India, went ahead and made statements along with his Pakistani counterpart, such as "Dialogue is the only way forward and that Action on terrorism should not be linked to the dialogue process. Dr. Singh also stated that India was ready to discuss all outstanding issues with Pakistan." The reason for changing the decision of not having dialogue with Pakistan which was made post Mumbai in a span of just 8 months even when no steps had been taken by Pakistan to nail down the culprits comes as a surprise to many.

If analysed further, you would know the reason for this change in decision abruptly, comes from the behind the closed door pressure being put by the US on India. Everything between the political leadership of both countries just looks fine since the recent visit of the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton to India, concluded. Even worse for India, was the signing of the joint statement in Egypt between the two Prime Ministers, which was very aptly named by the opposition as the "Sharm of Sharm-El -Sheikh". The Indian Authorities had recently also upgraded Pakistan by calling them a victim of terrorism just as India, though after the 'Sharm of Sharm-El-Sheikh' India has blindly downgraded themselves to Pakistan's level by allowing them to call India, sponsors of terrorism.

Analysing a little more and you would realise all the pressure generated by the Government just after the Mumbai Attacks was more so because the elections were around the corner, while now, the government when in power with almost a majority, has fallen to all the pressure of the US, and seem to have no zeal or the will to get Pakistan nail the terrorists.

The greatest return gift which could have been given by Pakistan to India after the recent joint statement, well, it has been the release of the main accused, the mastermind of Mumbai - Hafiz Saeed by the authorities in Pakistan due to lack of evidence. Nothing less than a slap on the face of the Indian government & its diplomacy.

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Sidharth Mehta
Dubai, UAE

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Key Tags: Sidharth Mehta, India Diplomacy, India Pakistan Relations, India Pakistan War, Mumbai Attacks Aftermath, India's Suicidal Diplomacy, Foreign Affairs India Pakistan,Nuclear Weapons India, Nuclear Power Pakistan, Political Crap, Sharm El Sheikh, Pakistan Terrorism, Disaster Sharm El Sheikh, Disaster Diplomacy India,
Hafiz Saeed

Tuesday, July 21, 2009

Mumbai 26/11 Attacks: Chilling Confession of Kasab


Finally, the man confessed to what the entire world (atleast all Indians) already knew. Before I pen down my thoughts and comments on the Mumbai Attacks, which is nothing less than a brain tumor, and which shall remain in the mind forever, I thought one should give a reading to the confession made by Kasab in court on 20th July 2009.

It is a chilling tale, which needs to be told to every citizen of this country (and of this world), just to reinstate the fact that we Indians, are such an easy target for these brainwashed men, who get all the sophisticated training and incentives for having an agenda to kill innocent people. Read it, and you shall know, that the local policemen who protect us in our country, do not get such a sophisticated and planned training what these 'juvenile kids and 20 somethings' are getting across the border.

And our authorities, as usual, are sitting ducks.

Sidharth Mehta
Dubai, UAE

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THE KILLINGS

Mujhe gunah kabool hai (I admit my crime). We fired on the public at CST — Abu Ismail and I. Ismail lobbed grenades and I fired with the gun. We went a little ahead and entered a hall where we had a skirmish with the police. After another exchange of fire, all was quiet. The photographs shown of us at CST are genuine. We went back towards the platform, crossed an iron footbridge and descended into an alley. I checked vehicles parked there so that we could drive off in one. The CCTV footage shown of us around those cars is correct. However, none of the cars could be opened and we proceeded on foot. Ismail and I loaded our AK-47s. On walking a little ahead, we saw a man running. I fired at him and Ismail fired inside a house.

When we reached the gate of Cama Hospital, we saw that the wall was not too high and jumped over it. Ismail told me to wait while he checked the premises. I heard the sound of gunfire. Ismail returned and asked me to follow him. A man dressed in white was lying dead. I did not see his face. Another man was lying on a stretcher in a pool of blood. We went up a flight of stairs to the fifth floor. We stopped three persons in the ward, including a witness in the present case, and asked him to lie down so that we could frisk him. We then locked up five others, one of whom was lying in a pool of blood, in a bathroom, warning them not to make any noise. We went up to the terrace. As soon as we entered, we saw a man. I asked him to show us the way out. He indicated that policemen were around — when we went down the staircase, we saw them for ourselves. I ran back and told Ismail.

He asked me where they were, but by then we could hear a commotion that the police had arrived. Ismail was near the door. He asked me to keep a watch on the terrace and asked for a grenade. I removed all the weapons from my bag and put them in Ismail’s bag. Firing started. I kept a watch on the terrace. Then we started running downstairs and someone fired upon us. I returned fire and came down. Ismail went out first. We could see policemen near the gate, but they didn’t notice us. Ismail said we should hide. There was a door near the wall, and a person was sitting outside the hall of the hospital. I warned him to keep mum, and we managed to get out of the hospital.

On the road, we saw a big blue vehicle coming towards us. We hid behind a small stall. The blue vehicle came nearer and Ismail lobbed a grenade at it. We then walked up to a bank and hid in some bushes. We saw the headlights of a vehicle, and as it came nearer to us there was firing from it. Ismail started firing back. I was injured on my right forearm, left wrist and right elbow. (Shows his injuries in court). My gun fell out of my hand and I also fell down. The firing continued, and Ismail walked towards the vehicle. He went to check it and kept firing on it. By then I got up and took my gun in my hand. I opened the doors of the police vehicle and found its occupants dead. We removed their bodies. Ismail started the jeep and I sat next to him. In the meantime there was firing on the vehicle but none of the bullets hit us. Ismail started driving with his left hand and firing with the other one. We took a right turn. Maine kaha main chal nahin sakta (I said I wouldn’t be able to walk). Ismail said ‘ Tu hausla mat haar. Mujhe bhi goli lagi hai ’ (Don’t lose courage. I have also been shot). He said he had been shot in the knee. I could tell from the noise of the wheel that it had been punctured. We did not know the roads. We saw policemen in a motor vehicle, and on seeing weapons in our hands they started firing at us. We fired in retaliation and the cops left the spot to hide. We decided to stop a vehicle. A Skoda car, with two men and a woman in it, was passing, and we stopped it and made the occupants get out. I told Ismail that we should conceal our weapons somewhere so that nobody would be able to recognise us. We continued to drive on the same road and reached the same spot where we had hijacked the car. We saw the owner telling the police that it was his car. We started following a white car. A little ahead we could see barriers on the road. The white car went past them but policemen directed us to stop. I asked Ismail to slow down. A policeman came in front of the car. Ismail tried taking a U-turn. We could not understand anything and suddenly the wipers also started. Policemen came to the car, and one of them caught me by the collar. He pulled me out of the car. I was surrounded by policemen and one of them snatched my AK-47, which was in my hand. They started hitting me in my stomach and also with the butt of my gun. I did not fire. When I regained consciousness I was in hospital. I had not fired because I could not hold my gun.

HUM DUS THE (WE WERE TEN)

We travelled from Karachi in a small boat. Four persons came to see us off — Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi, Abu Hamza, Abu Kafa and Abu Jundala. I did not know the others personally but I can tell their names. Abu Ismail (he was our boss), Abu Akasha, Abu Umer, Abu Shoaib, Abu Ali, Abdul Rehman Chhota, Abdul Rehman Bada, Hafiz Arshad and Abu Fadaullah, who had a finger missing. A small boat from Karachi transported us to a big boat, which we used to get on to the high seas. There were three people on the small boat. I only remember the name of Hakib. On the big boat called ‘Al Huseini’ we slept and said our namaaz. When it sailed there were seven people on it — Murshad, Aqib, Usman... I don’t remember the other names. Murshad was the boss.

We were looking for another boat and spotted one. At 4 pm, it was brought to ‘Al Huseini’ and we started loading it with oil, blankets, rations and other things. The remaining articles were thrown into the sea. Murshad asked the five crew members of the other boat who their ‘naqva’ (navigator) was, and Amarjit Singh Solanki said it was him. The other four were taken to ‘Al Huseini’ and Singh remained on board. Murshad told us to take blankets and go to sleep. He told Ismail to take Solanki’s help in case of difficulty. A big GPS set was also given to Ismail, which we threw into the sea when we reached India.

THE TRAINING

Last year, when I was working as a decorator in Jhelum city, my colleague, Muzaffar, suggested that we turn to dacoity for better money. I left the job, went to Rawalpindi with him and took a room on rent. We decided to commit dacoity at a certain bungalow. I was roaming alone at Rawalpindi’s Raza market when I saw some Mujahideens buying animal skins. From my childhood, I had been hearing of these Mujahideens. They are known by their long hair and beards. A few days later, Muzaffar returned and we both visited the same market and were discussing our plans to rob the bungalow. I repeatedly asked him where we would get the weapons and how would we pull it off. I told him then that I had seen Mujahideens at the market, and that we could get weapons training from them, to which he agreed. We found out where their office was, and went there. A man asked me what I had come for. I told him we had come for Jihad, so he let us in. One person asked me my name, address and asked me to return next morning with extra clothes.
We returned with our baggage and we were given a chit on which was written the address of a training camp in Muridke. Three weeks later, I was sent from there to another camp. In the evening we went to Buttal jungle, where I met Muzaffar. We were given 21 days of training. After his training was over, Muzaffar’s brother took him back home but I was told that I was going for bigger training.

Here, I was taught exercises, operating weapons like AK-47, guns and pistols. Three months went by like this. My trainer Abu Abdul Rehman asked me to bring my identity card from my native Okara district. I visited an office in Model Town there and was asked to go to Muzaffarabad in Azad Kashmir. Once in Muzaffarabad, I was asked to look for Saeed Bhai’s office. I told them that I had come for Daura-E-Khaas (special training), and filled up a form. The next morning, we reached a training camp, where Abu Maaviya was our trainer and trained me for three months in operating rocket launchers, grenades, AK-47s and other sophisticated weapons. Then I was sent to my Faridkot home. I was told to return to Saeed Bhai’s office after a week, which I did.

Ten days later, Saeed bhai, Abu Kafa and Abu Hamza came there and selected 15 of us. We were taken to Muzaffarabad and then to Muridke. Kafa was with me and we were trained to swim. A month later, we were taken to Karachi’s seashore from where we were taken in small boats to big ones. The idea was to check if we could adjust to the sea’s rough weather or not, and to see if we suffered from sea-sickness. We were then brought back to the same place and then two days later, we were again taken to Muzaffarabad where we met Hamza.

Of the 15 of us, two had run away, while six were sent to Kashmir. So seven of us were left, to which three other boys were added, making us ten in all. Hamza had a separate room, to which he would call us in pairs. On two occasions, he showed Ismail and me movies and pictures of CST station on his laptop. We were then taken to forests, trained further in firing, and were brought back. Two days later, we were given trousers and T-shirts, and our photographs were taken and our fake ID-cards made. Kafa took us to Karachi and gave us small bomb kits. We were asked to note down the time when the bomb kit’s battery would turn on.

We stayed there for more than 90 days. We were trained to use an inflatable boat. It is the same boat produced in court. In Karachi we stayed in the same house that was shown on Geo TV. Two or three days before November 22, 2008, Hamza again came and played the same CST video to us. We were given arms and ammunition. Those bags were transported to Al-Huseini.

Kafa took us to the Karachi shore where Al-Huseini was anchored. Lakhwi, Hamza and Abu Jundal joined Kafa on the shore, while we were to leave for Mumbai. Jundal Hindustani hai, unhonein hi humein Hindi sikhaaein . My wish is that you should end this trial and punish me.

I wanted to confess much earlier but could not do so as Pakistan had disowned me. Now Pakistan is saying that I am a Pakistani.

They are also going to prosecute the offenders. Don’t ask me how I know all this. I just do. You
should accept my confession and punish me.

-----
Courtesy - The Times of India.

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