Tuesday, January 25, 2011

Obama's State of the Union and U.S. Foreign Policy

Obama's State of the Union and U.S. Foreign Policy is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

By George Friedman


U.S. President Barack Obama will deliver the State of the Union address tonight. The administration has let the media know that the focus of the speech will be on jobs and the economy. Given the strong showing of the Republicans in the last election, and the fact that they have defined domestic issues as the main battleground, Obama’s decision makes political sense. He will likely mention foreign issues and is undoubtedly devoting significant time to them, but the decision not to focus on foreign affairs in his State of the Union address gives the impression that the global situation is under control. Indeed, the Republican focus on domestic matters projects the same sense. Both sides create the danger that the public will be unprepared for some of the international crises that are already quite heated. We have discussed these issues in detail, but it is useful to step back and look at the state of the world for a moment.


Afghanistan


The United States remains the most powerful nation in the world, both in the size of its economy and the size of its military. Nevertheless, it continues to have a singular focus on the region from Iraq to Pakistan. Obama argued during his campaign that President George W. Bush had committed the United States to the wrong war in Iraq and had neglected the important war in Afghanistan. After being elected, Obama continued the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq that began under the Bush administration while increasing troop levels in Afghanistan. He has also committed himself to concluding the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of this year. Now, it may be that the withdrawal will not be completed on that schedule, but the United States already has insufficient forces in Iraq to shape events very much, and a further drawdown will further degrade this ability. In war, force is not symbolic.


This poses a series of serious problems for the United States. First, the strategic goal of the United States in Afghanistan is to build an Afghan military and security force that can take over from the United States in the coming years, allowing the United States to withdraw from the country. In other words, as in Vietnam, the United States wants to create a pro-American regime with a loyal army to protect American interests in Afghanistan without the presence of U.S. forces. I mention Vietnam because, in essence, this is Richard Nixon’s Vietnamization program applied to Afghanistan. The task is to win the hearts and minds of the people, isolate the guerrillas and use the pro-American segments of the population to buttress the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and provide recruits for the military and security forces.


The essential problem with this strategy is that it wants to control the outcome of the war while simultaneously withdrawing from it. For that to happen, the United States must persuade the Afghan people (who are hardly a single, united entity) that committing to the United States is a rational choice when the U.S. goal is to leave. The Afghans must first find the Americans more attractive than the Taliban. Second, they must be prepared to shoulder the substantial risks and burdens the Americans want to abandon. And third, the Afghans must be prepared to engage the Taliban and defeat them or endure the consequences of their own defeat.


Given that there is minimal evidence that the United States is winning hearts and minds in meaningful numbers, the rest of the analysis becomes relatively unimportant. But the point is that NATO has nearly 150,000 troops fighting in Afghanistan, the U.S. president has pledged to begin withdrawals this year, beginning in July, and all the Taliban have to do is not lose in order to win. There does not have to be a defining, critical moment for the United States to face defeat. Rather, the defeat lurks in the extended inability to force the Taliban to halt operations and in the limits on the amount of force available to the United States to throw into the war. The United States can fight as long as it chooses. It has that much power. What it seems to lack is the power to force the enemy to capitulate.


Iraq


In the meantime, the wrong war, Iraq, shows signs of crisis or, more precisely, crisis in the context of Iran. The United States is committed to withdrawing its forces from Iraq by the end of 2011. This has two immediate consequences. First, it increases Iranian influence in Iraq simply by creating a vacuum the Iraqis themselves cannot fill. Second, it escalates Iranian regional power. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq without a strong Iraqi government and military will create a crisis of confidence on the Arabian Peninsula. The Saudis, in particular, unable to match Iranian power and doubtful of American will to resist Iran, will be increasingly pressured, out of necessity, to find a political accommodation with Iran. The Iranians do not have to invade anyone to change the regional balance of power decisively.


In the extreme, but not unimaginable, case that Iran turns Iraq into a satellite, Iranian power would be brought to the borders of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria and would extend Iran’s border with Turkey. Certainly, the United States could deal with Iran, but having completed its withdrawal from Iraq, it is difficult to imagine the United States rushing forces back in. Given the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan, it is difficult to see what ground forces would be available.


The withdrawal from Iraq creates a major crisis in 2011. If it is completed, Iran’s power will be enhanced. If it is aborted, the United States will have roughly 50,000 troops, most in training and support modes and few deployed in a combat mode, and the decision of whether to resume combat will be in the hands of the Iranians and their Iraqi surrogates. Since 170,000 troops were insufficient to pacify Iraq in the first place, sending in more troops makes little sense. As in Afghanistan, the U.S. has limited ground forces in reserve. It can build a force that blocks Iran militarily, but it will also be a force vulnerable to insurgent tactics — a force deployed without a terminal date, possibly absorbing casualties from Iranian-backed forces.


Iran


If the United States is prepared to complete the withdrawal of troops from Iraq in 2011, it must deal with Iran prior to the withdrawal. The two choices are a massive air campaign to attempt to cripple Iran or a negotiated understanding with Iran. The former involves profound intelligence uncertainties and might fail, while the latter might not be attractive to the Iranians. They are quite content seeing the United States leave. The reason the Iranians are so intransigent is not that they are crazy. It is that they think they hold all the cards and that time is on their side. The nuclear issue is hardly what concerns them.


The difference between Afghanistan and Iraq is that a wrenching crisis can be averted in Afghanistan simply by continuing to do what the United States is already doing. By continuing to do what it is doing in Iraq, the United States inevitably heads into a crisis as the troop level is drawn down.


Obama’s strategy appears to be to continue to carry out operations in Afghanistan, continue to withdraw from Iraq and attempt to deal with Iran through sanctions. This is an attractive strategy if it works. But the argument I am making is that the Afghan strategy can avoid collapse but not with a high probability of success. I am also extremely dubious that sanctions will force a change of course in Iran. For one thing, their effectiveness depends on the actual cooperation of Russia and China (as well as the Europeans). Sufficient exceptions have been given by the Obama administration to American companies doing business with Iran that others will feel free to act in their own self-interest.


But more than that, sanctions can unify a country. The expectations that some had about the Green Revolution of 2009 have been smashed, or at least should have been. We doubt that there is massive unhappiness with the regime waiting to explode, and we see no signs that the regime can’t cope with existing threats. The sanctions even provide Iran with cover for economic austerity while labeling resistance unpatriotic. As I have argued before, sanctions are an alternative to a solution, making it appear that something is being done when in fact nothing is happening.


There are numerous other issues Obama could address, ranging from Israel to Mexico to Russia. But, in a way, there is no point. Until the United States frees up forces and bandwidth and reduces the dangers in the war zones, it will lack the resources — intellectual and material — to deal with these other countries. It is impossible to be the single global power and focus only on one region, yet it is also impossible to focus on the world while most of the fires are burning in a single region. This, more than any other reason, is why Obama must conclude these conflicts, or at least create a situation where these conflicts exist in the broader context of American interests. There are multiple solutions, all with significant risks. Standing pat is the riskiest.

Domestic Issues


There is a parallel between Obama’s foreign policy problems and his domestic policy problems. Domestically, Obama is trapped by the financial crisis and the resulting economic problems, particularly unemployment. He cannot deal with other issues until he deals with that one. There are a host of foreign policy issues, including the broader question of the general approach Obama wants to take toward the world. The United States is involved in two wars with an incipient crisis in Iran. Nothing else can be addressed until those wars are dealt with.

The decision to focus on domestic issues makes political sense. It also makes sense in a broader way. Obama does not yet have a coherent strategy stretching from Iraq to Afghanistan. Certainly, he inherited the wars, but they are now his. The Afghan war has no clear endpoint, while the Iraq war does have a clear endpoint — but it is one that is enormously dangerous.

It is unlikely that he will be able to avoid some major foreign policy decisions in the coming year. It is also unlikely that he has a clear path. There are no clear paths, and he is going to have to hack his way to solutions. But the current situation does not easily extend past this year, particularly in Iraq and Iran, and they both require decisions. Presidents prefer not making decisions, and Obama has followed that tradition. Presidents understand that most problems in foreign affairs take care of themselves. But some of the most important ones don’t. The Iraq-Iran issue is, I think, one of those, and given the reduction of U.S. troops in 2011, this is the year decisions will have to be made.

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Key tags: Sidharth Mehta, Stratfor, War Intelligence, Military Intelligence, USA Afghan War, US Iraq War, US disaster in Iraq, US Iran War, US wars in the middle east, identity crysys, identity crisis, sid mehta, siddharth mehta, full start, Dubai

Sunday, January 23, 2011

Movie Review - Dhobi Ghat




Movie: Dhobi Ghat (Mumbai Diaries), Hindi - 2011
Prateik Babbar, Monica Dogra, Kriti Malhotra, Aamir Khan
Director - Kiran Rao
Aamir Khan Productions
Rating - 'unrated'
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I am confused. And that is the exact reason for not rating this movie. I am not sure if I liked it, or if I hated it. Precisely because of this confusion, I thought, the movie surely deserved a review/post on my blog. I leave it to the viewers of the movie to give their own personal rating/assessment of the movie, as I am sure there would be a plenty on both sides. (Do leave your assessment on the comments section)

I went to watch this movie with an expectation of not being entertained. I was correct. I was not entertained. (Obviously, I did hope that the movie would surprise me, and there would be moments which will entertain, but that wasn't the case...)

I wanted to see this movie for the love I have for the city of Bombay, and for its people. The love has only increased further after watching the movie.

I went to see the movie with an expectation of some incredible performances by the lead actors. Well, if not incredible, the performances were ranging from good to great.

I went with the hope of being witness to a gripping story. Alright now here comes the surprise; there was no story. This is where the movie disappoints the most. Kiran Rao proves to be a promising director with some great talent, but disappoints as a story teller. The movie starts abruptly, and ends even more abruptly. As a viewer, I felt as if I began to watch a movie which has already run for 20-30 minutes, therefore from somewhere in between. And when a story actually starts to develop, the movie ends!. The movie does not give a chance to the story to grow on the audience.

I would put this movie into a category of experiential cinema. Do not confuse this to something like experiential marketing, which is about engaging consumers by reaching out to their senses. Kiran, has created on cinema, what she has experienced about the city of Bombay. The moments, people, and places in Bombay which has touched her senses, is what she has presented on screen. Nothing wrong in that, but as mentioned, it is the story telling skill which has faltered. I do not see the movie getting a connect even with the audience in Bombay, not because the characters in the movie are unreal; the characters are very much real, but more so because when the connection could have been made, the movie ends.

In terms of performances, Prateik steals the show. There is an ease in the way he acts, and makes him quite a natural actor. The movie pretty much revolves around him and the character 'Shai' played by Monica Dogra. Even she has performed well doing justice to the NRI- Investment Banker/Photographer role. Kriti Malhotra, has more to do behind the camera than in front of it. You will know what I mean, if you have seen the movie, or when you watch it. Having said so, it was her story towards the end which brings about a change in the otherwise plain vanilla storyline. Aamir Khan, as always performs great, but really does not have much to do. Though, kudos to him for being a part of the movie as an actor as well, where much focus is on the other actors, leave aside the scope for acting....

There is no denying the fact that 'Bombay' is the 5th character of the movie. The city has been shown as a witness to whatever is happening in the characters lives. If you delve into the story and the idea a little deep, you would notice, that Kiran has put the 'old mute lady' in the storyline as a metaphor for the city.

Towards the end, I would just say, that the movie makes me numb. I do not feel anything, but the movie still makes me think. I guess it does that because it ends abruptly the moment when I was getting to connect with the characters.

Do post in your comments.

Sidharth Mehta
Dubai, UAE
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Key Tags - Dhobi Ghat, Dhobi Ghat Review, Dhobi Ghat Movie Review, Dhobi Ghat Aamir Khan, Dhobi Ghat Kiran Rao, Dhobi Ghat Prateik Babbar, Dhobi Ghat Prateek, Monica Dogra, Kriti Malhotra, Dhobi Ghat Times of India Movie Review, Dhobi Ghat Hindustan Times Review, Mayank Shankar Dhobi Ghat, Dhobi Ghat Rediff Review, Raja Sen, Dhobi Ghat Movie, Sidharth Mehta, Sid Mehta, Siddharth Mehta, Bollywood Movie Reviews, Infinity Business School Alumni, Identity Crysys, Identity Crisis, Full Start, Sidharth Mehta Blog, Siddharth Mehta Blog, Sid Mehta Blog

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